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Introduction
The process of designing the Green Climate Fund (GCF) will reshape the global architecture of climate change financing over the coming months. The commitment to establish the GCF was the most tangible outcome of the December 2010 Cancun meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 16) .
1 Yet the promise of the GCF is imperiled by its embrace of 20th century state-centric approaches to governance that fail to engage the resources and energies of non-state actors.
The initial meetings of the GCF transitional committee and submissions by its members have revealed major North-South fault lines over the Fund's structure and governance. Developed country governments are focused on ensuring that the Fund is accountable for results and able to generate private resources. Developing country governments seek to ensure that the Fund receives adequate resources from donor governments and that developing countries control the allocation of those resources. So far, however, proposals for GCF governance generally reflect a "monopoly of states" approach, 2 which will make it more difficult for the transitional committee to overcome its internal divides and for the Fund to achieve its mission, including attracting public and private resources.
In global health and other fields, in contrast, international institutions are increasingly integrating the capacities of civil society and other stakeholders by opening space for them to participate directly in institutional decision-making. Expanded civil society participation holds the key to reconciling the competing visions for the GCF that currently divide governments. Rather than retreating to the traditional state-centric approach, the designers of the GCF should learn from the new generation of innovative participatory health institutions, which are successfully mobilizing public and private resources, connecting financing with results and empowering countrylevel actors for policy-making and implementation.
LEGACIES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
International environmental institutions were once at the forefront of the "participatory revolution" through consultation mechanisms segregated from actual decision-making. Yet recently created environmental institutions are often not even keeping pace with their predecessors, and none are on a par with participatory health institutions.
Since the 1972 Stockholm Conference, non-governmental organizations have taken part in all major international environmental conferences, typically outnumbering government delegates. Following the 1992 Rio Conference, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) -the core environmental organization -added mechanisms for civil society input that included an annual Global Civil Society Forum and the Major Groups Facilitating Committee. The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) went even further, pioneering "multi-stakeholder dialogues" in which representatives of the Major Groups engage with Commission members. Since 2002, CSD has further expanded opportunities for dialogue, while still excluding civil society from any direct role in policy-making. 4 Environmental financing agencies initially followed a similar path. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) funds the "agreed incremental costs" of projects in developing and transitional economy countries that further global environmental goals, including climate change and biodiversity; it operates the financial mechanism of the Framework Convention on Climate Change
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. Only states serve on GEF's principal governing body, the Council. 6 The Council sponsors an NGO Consultation before each meeting, but many Council members fail to attend. 7 Civil society observers may attend Council meetings, but may only speak when invited. GEF's NGO Network selects civil society representatives to perform these functions, with financial and administrative support from GEF. At the project level, GEF calls for public involvement in design, implementation and evaluation, including stakeholder participation "as appropriate," but with its Implementing Agencies retains all decisionmaking authority. Pressed by NGOs, however, CIF commissioned the IUCN to study best practices in civil society participation, and adopted most of its short-term recommendations. 11 The Clean Technology Committee now includes four "active observers" from civil society and two from the private sector; the Strategic Climate Committee adds two from indigenous peoples; and the Climate Resilience Program includes one from a "community dependent on adaptation to secure livelihoods." Observers represent their constituency, with CIF-appointed organizations facilitating selection processes. To date, however, civil society observers have had limited impact on decisionmaking. 12 Unlike GEF, CIF has made few specific arrangements for civil society participation in funded projects, relying on World Bank procedures. 13 The Adaptation Fund (AF) marks a significant retreat from this mixed record of participatory innovation. Its retreat is both striking and troublesome, as it is difficult to think of an area that demands greater civil society input and buy-in, especially at the local level, than adaptation to climate change. The AF grew out of the Kyoto Protocol, which requires that a share of proceeds from Clean Development Mechanism projects be used to finance adaptation in vulnerable developing countries.
14 The AF Board (AFB) is made up of representatives from 16 states adhering to the Protocol. 15 Civil society and stakeholder involvement is limited to attendance at AFB meetings by accredited observers and to a recently-initiated formal dialogue with observers near the end of the agenda. Funded projects are to be "country-driven," but the AF interprets that principle to emphasize the role of governments, with no meaningful participation by stakeholders. 16 In short, while international environmental governance was initially ahead of the curve in incorporating input from civil society and other stakeholders, progress in this important area has stalled. The Adaptation Fund represents a clear step backward. The designers of the GCF should be expanding upon earlier models of participation in environmental governance, but are instead following the AF in a short-sighted retreat to state-centric governance.
10 IUCN, Review of Practices, supra.
11 IUCN, Review of Practices, supra. 
THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND
The Cancun COP initiated a process for establishing the GCF. It created a transitional committee to design the Fund, made up of 40 state representatives with appropriate skills and experience. 17 The COP provided only that the Fund should be accountable to and subject to the guidance of the COP, and governed by a Green Climate Board of 24 members (plus alternates) with equal numbers of developing and developed country representatives. 18 Within these very rough outlines, the transitional committee is empowered to shape the GCF in preparation for COP consideration at Durban.
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The North-South fault lines over Fund governance appeared in the very first transitional committee meeting: developing country governments focused on the balance of power between states and the need for significant donor resources, while potential donor governments focused on accountability for expenditures and the Fund's capacity to generate private resources. 20 For example, Brazil highlighted the importance of a governance structure which gives developing countries voice and ownership, while Samoa highlighted the importance of predictable financing and direct access to resources by Southern governments. Among developed countries, the United Kingdom identified ten key criteria for the Fund, including effectiveness, value for money and private sector engagement. The United States pointed to the necessity of using a range of financial instruments to attract private sector resources. Australia and France called for a results-based approach to attract private investment. These positions have generally been maintained in country submissions to the transitional committee.
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On the issue of participation in the transitional committee itself, members agreed that decision-making should remain with states. Several governments even emphasized the importance of clarifying the roles of observers to maintain distinctions in status 17 Most committee members are government officials, but a few are academic experts with government affiliations. http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/green_climate_fund/items/5938.php 18 The COP specified that the developing country bloc should include representatives of the UN regions, least developed countries and small island states. It also decided that the GCF should be supported by an independent secretariat and administered by a trustee; the World Bank currently serves as trustee. 19 The COP's terms of reference for the committee call for it to prepare specified operational documents, including "legal and institutional arrangements for the establishment and operationalization" of the GCF, by COP 17 in Durban. Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix III 20 Authors' notes on Committee meeting 21 See e.g. Submission of Japan ("The most important in our view is that the GCF is structured in such a way that will leverage a wide variety of financial resources from the private and public sectors"); GCF Design Document: UK Perspective (11/8/11)(highlighting need for GCF to "demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness" and to "leverage private sector finance"); Submission of Belize ("I would like to ensure that we do not lose sight of our principal stakeholders who are developing countries, especially those that are currently experiencing the adverse effects of climate change"); Submission of Nicaragua ("The public sector should be the principal recipient of funding at the national level ... The Fund should not directly deal with private or civil society entities within a country") among states, international organizations and NGOs. The private sector and private foundations were poorly represented at the meeting, leaving only NGOs to argue for stakeholder involvement.
At the most recent transitional committee meeting, in July 2011, thirteen developing countries put forward a proposal covering a range of governance issues. 22 The proposal assumes that states alone will be represented on the Board, and calls for equitable and geographically balanced representation of all UNFCCC Parties. It also highlights the importance of a country-driven approach to resource allocation -without specifying whether this refers only to national government control, as in the Adaptation Fund, or also includes stakeholder involvement in country-level policy and projects. Non-state observers addressed the committee at the beginning of the meeting, calling for meaningful stakeholder input at both the GCF-and country levels.
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With very little time remaining before the Durban Summit, the lingering divisions between North and South remain a major obstacle to structuring the GCF. Evidence from recent global health institutions suggests that a governance structure limited to states is unlikely to reconcile these competing visions or to achieve the central objectives of either North or South.
EMERGING PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE
Recent global health institutions have moved beyond the consultative procedures adopted by UNEP, CSD and GEF. They embrace a multi-stakeholder model in which civil society, the private sector, foundations, and other constituencies -including populations directly affected by health threats -participate directly in governing bodies, deliberation and decision-making.
UNAIDS was the first UN body to include civil society representatives on its governing body. UNAIDS was established in 1994 to coordinate the response of multiple UN agencies to the HIV-AIDS crisis. With AIDS activists demanding a place at the table, a multi-stakeholder task force, including three NGOs, was established to design the new body. The UNAIDS Program Coordinating Board now includes five NGO delegates; at least three are people living with HIV-AIDS. UNAIDS supports NGO participation and communication with national and regional constituencies. Yet while NGO delegates may speak near the end of board meetings, they may not "participate in any part of the formal decision-making process, including the right to vote which is reserved for representatives of Governments." 24 The GAVI Alliance finances vaccine purchases and immunization programs in developing countries, as well as vaccine research. Established in 1999, GAVI was designed as a public-private partnership, with a strong participatory role for non-state actors. 25 The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which provides substantial core funding, holds a permanent seat on the GAVI Board; NGOs, research institutes and Northern and Southern vaccine industries hold rotating Board seats. In contrast to UNAIDS, all Board members have full voting rights. In 2005, GAVI further broadened participation by adding five "unaffiliated" Board seats for expert individuals. GAVI also engages with civil society through its Partners' Forum. Its Civil Society Constituency, an NGO network, funnels input into decision-making, with support from GAVI. 26 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, again designed by a multistakeholder committee, provides even broader and deeper stakeholder participation. The Fund reserves separate Board seats for developing and developed country NGOs, and for people living with the target diseases. 27 Civil society delegates have significant voting power, as they sit with the Board's recipient bloc; in the absence of consensus, the donor and recipient blocs must each approve decisions by two-thirds vote. The Fund establishes a full-fledged constituency system: each Board member represents a constituency, and a communications focal point manages an inclusive selection process within each constituency. The Fund also convenes a broad Partnership Forum.
The Global Fund introduced a particularly innovative arrangement for country-level participation. A multi-stakeholder Country Coordinating Mechanism must approve grant applications, nominate grant recipients and oversee implementation. 28 Fund guidelines call for at least 40% of CCM members to be non-state actors, including NGOs, people living with the diseases, the private sector and academic institutions.
29
Each constituency selects its own representatives. The Fund supports CCMs, and encourages grants to private recipients as well as governments, to build capacity and engagement.
REVIVING PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
The global health institutions that embrace multi-stakeholder governance have realized significant successes on many important measures. Environmental institutions that utilize only consultative mechanisms, in contrast, are proving less effective in leveraging the full potential of civil society and other stakeholders.
Direct participation in the governance of an institution allows civil society actors to contribute information and expertise. Beyond mere information, however, direct participation allows them to introduce their subjective understandings of situations and issues, their values and their normative commitments -all essential for sound policy formulation and institutional legitimacy. Civil society perspectives and judgments are particularly valuable when considering long-term issues such as climate change, which affects future generations and the entire planetary system. NGOs also serve as "voices of the weak and powerless" 30 and as "transmission belts" communicating the concerns, understandings and local knowledge of small-scale communities such as those facing adaptation, which might otherwise never reach international institutions. To be sure, consultation mechanisms can tap some of this input. But participation allows civil society representatives to argue for their positions in the give and take of deliberation.
31 Without direct participation, there is little reason to believe their perspectives will strongly influence governments.
As compared to consultation, direct participation also generates a stronger sense of civil society ownership, crucial to institutional success. For example, over the last decade participatory health institutions have been among the most successful at mobilizing resources. Key to this success has been the development of engaged and empowered constituencies in donor countries: in organizations such as the Global Fund, these groups have shown a strong commitment to leverage contributions from their home countries. GAVI, with its relatively narrow focus, received contributions and commitments of more than $12 billion over eleven years of existence. 32 Over an even shorter time, the Global Fund received more than $30 billion in pledges and over $19 billion in contributions. 33 In contrast, over nearly 20 years GEF received replenishment commitments totaling $16 billion. 34 The Adaptation Fund has to date received contributions of only $225 million. On broader measures of effectiveness, recent independent evaluations confirm that participatory health institutions are outperforming less participatory environmental institutions. A review of 43 multilateral organizations by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) found that GAVI and the Global Fund were among the few offering "very good value for money" 36 , while GEF and CIF ranked lower, providing only "good value for money." Separately, the DFID review examined each institution's organizational strength and contribution to the UK's development objectives, which include addressing climate change. GAVI and the Global Fund ranked well above GEF and CIF in both areas 37 , due to their focus on results, transparency and accountability and multi-stakeholder participation.
A review by the Center for Global Development and the Brookings Institution reached similar conclusions. 38 The Global Fund and GAVI received top ratings for efficiency, while GEF was below average. Both health institutions also received among the highest rankings for transparency and learning; GEF was again below average. In addition, the IUCN study of civil society participation commissioned by CIF found that "feedback from the Global Fund is clear that including civil society in decision-making at the country level has resulted in more effective and sustainable programs and projects."
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As a result, IUCN recommended that CIF gradually expand civil society participation beyond the "active observer" model, eventually authorizing representatives to participate fully in decision-making, at least on specific matters. These evaluations suggest that participatory models of governance are contributing both to greater transparency and accountability, and to greater institutional effectiveness.
DESIGNING THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND
The success of participatory global health institutions argues for a re-thinking of the state-centric assumptions driving the design of the Green Climate Fund, as well as the Adaptation Fund and related funding bodies. Ideally, the GCF should build on the lessons of other 21st century international institutions by adopting a multi-stakeholder governance structure, including civil society and other private stakeholders as full partners in achieving the Fund's objectives.
In this structure, the Fund Board should include representatives of diverse stakeholder groups, with the capacity to drive civil society ownership, expand resource mobilization, deepen deliberation and catalyze institutional effectiveness. At the least, the Board should reserve seats for NGOs from the North and South, communities directly affected by climate change, private foundations and the private sector. Each of these constituencies should be a full participant in Fund governance. The GCF should also require, like the Global Fund, that governments include civil society and other stakeholders in national coordinating bodies that will shape applications for funding and supervise the distribution of Fund resources at country and project level, ensuring a broad sense of ownership and promoting a focus on the most vulnerable populations. 40 The GCF should adopt a constituency model of representation to address the challenges of expanded participation, and support its operation through a communications focal point or similar mechanism. This model works effectively in other institutions, although constituency procedures are still in their infancy. 41 To maintain accountability, any system of representation requires significant connections between individual or organizational representatives and their constituencies. Constituency models link representatives to the segments of civil society they represent through elections or other mechanisms by which stakeholders can select representatives and hold them accountable. These mechanisms strengthen the representativeness and legitimacy of civil society participation, and provide a bulwark against cooptation and capture.
The constituency model also provides other benefits. It enables the development of new constituency leadership, as by selecting alternative delegates who can learn how organizations and constituencies function. Similarly, constituency activities help build valuable capacities. In other institutions, the constituency approach has helped transform the nature of participation and fostered contributions that reflect broad perspectives and commitment to the institution.
CONCLUSION
The Green Climate Fund holds enormous potential to attract and deploy resources to respond to the adverse impacts of climate change. Yet early discussions of the design of the Fund are stuck in a 20th century state-centric model. In the 21st century, the most effective and legitimate international institutions will likely be those that engage civil society and other essential stakeholders in innovative ways. Direct stakeholder participation in Fund governance can reconcile the competing visions for its future that now divide North and South. Participatory institutions have successfully attracted donor state and private contributions, while fostering greater accountability, broader participation, and true country-driven resource allocations. By including civil society and other stakeholders in its governing body and country-level implementation mechanisms, the GCF would be adopting the best practices of 21st century international institutions, helping it to confront an unprecedented global challenge with all the tools available.
To be sure, our recommendations face significant procedural hurdles. The COP has determined that the Green Climate Board will be made up of "members from developing and developed country Parties," a phrase that appears to reflect a statecentric vision. 42 The transitional committee may determine that it lacks the authority to change this approach, although the possibility of non-state representatives serving on the Board in a non-voting capacity was at least raised at the second committee meeting. 43 Surely, however, the committee could recommend to the COP that it modify the GCF's inter-state structure. Alternatively, concerned governments and stakeholders could present such a recommendation and urge the COP to adopt it at Durban.
If these approaches fail -or indeed even if they succeed -actors concerned with environmental governance should take a broader lesson from the recent history of global health institutions: effective and legitimate multi-stakeholder bodies are far more likely to emerge from multi-stakeholder planning and decision processes than from inter-governmental negotiations. UNAIDS, GAVI and the Global Fund were all designed by participatory working groups. In the near term, then, participatory planning committees could be established to design multi-stakeholder counterparts to state-centric bodies such as the GCF and Adaptation Fund. Over the longer term, as the international community continues to grapple with financing for adaptation, mitigation and other global environmental challenges, multi-stakeholder design processes, leading to multi-stakeholder institutions, should become the norm.
